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Wilfred Oppel* Step-Parent Adoptions in
Nova Scotia and British
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1. Introduction
The basic purpose of this article is to examine that area of the law
which deals with adoption by step-parents. In particular, the law of
Nova Scotia and British Columbia will be considered. The approach
taken will be to focus on the relevant statute law and selected cases
which deal with the subject under scrutiny. Reference will also be
made to recent developments in the law relating to adoption in
England. Additionally, the latter part of this paper will deal with
some alternatives to the granting of adoptions to step-parents.
The particular issues and problems raised by step-parent
adoptions, however, are best understood if viewed against the
background of the history and practice of "conventional"
adoptions.
II. History ofAdoption
The origins of adoptions are lost in the early mists of history.
References to adoption are to be found in such antique records as the
Code of Hammurabi, 1 the Old Testament, 2 and the writings of the
Roman philosophers. 3 As Huard notes, ancient adoption practice
had two primary purposes - first, it insured the continuity of the
adopter's family and second, it perpetuated the local worship by
initiating the adoptee into the new religion. 4 "Adoption, as thus
practised, contemplated complete serverance of relationship
between the adoptee and his natural family and complete acceptance
into the adopter's family.'' 5 Thus, under the Roman law, the
adopted person acquired all the benefits of a natural son, including
inheriting the family name, the family religion, and (more
*Wilfred Oppel, LI. B., Dalhousie, 1980
1. "If a man take a child in his name, adopt and rear him as a son, this grown up
son may not be demanded back," from Huard, "Law of Adoption: Ancient and
Modern" (1956), 9 Vanderbilt L.R. 743 at 744
2. Ecodus 2:10
3. Supra, note 1 at 745
4. Supra, note 1 at 745
5. Id. at 744
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importantly) the family wealth. Roman adoption subsequently
became part of the civil law of the countries on the European
continent.
Adoption, in its current form, made a late entrance on to the stage
of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 6 The American states of
Louisiana and Texas had a form of Roman-style adoption as
evidenced by case reports of 18327 and 18638 respectively. This
undoubtedly reflects the continued influence of French and Spanish
civil law which had earlier been introduced into those areas.
Adoption statutes appeared in Mississippi in 18469, in Mas-
sachusets in 185110, and in New Brunswick in 1873.11 In England,
Roman-style adoption was not possible until the passing of the
Adoption of Children Act 1926.12
As Huard' 3 and Stone 14 point out, the early English and North
American adoption statutes were motivated primarily by an
increasing public concern for the welfare of children who were the
victims of unfortunate circumstances. Thus, unlike the ancient
adoption practices, modern adoption statutes have a genesis in a
concern for the "welfare of the child." If one accepts the fact that
the precursors of present-day adoption statutes were enacted to help
solve the "troublesome social problem of illegitimate, abandoned,
dependent and neglected children,' "15 then it becomes obvious that
the advent of increasing numbers of joint adoptions by one natural
parent and a step-parent forms a class of adoptions which was not
within the contemplation of the original legislators, and for which
the rules governing "conventional" adoptions may not be
appropriate.
There is no doubt that social attitudes are changing. Divorce has
become relatively common-place, and more single parents are
6. Id. at 747. Also see 0. Stone, Family Law (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd.,
1977) at 225,226
8. Teal v. Sevier(1863), 26 Tex. 516
7. Fuselier v. Masse (1832), 4 La. 423
9. Supra, note 1 at 748
10. Id.
11. S.N.B. 1873, c. 30. The giving of consent of the natural parents, then, as now,
was of concern to the legislators drafting this quaint statute. In the event that the
adoptee had neither parents, guardians, nor next of kin, then consent (by s.3) could
be given by a "discreet and suitable barrister, to be appointed by the Judge. .
12. 16& 17 Geo. 5, c. 29
13. Supra, note I at 748
14. Supra, note 6 at 226
15. Supra, note I at 749
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tackling the job of raising their illegitimate children. These two
social phenomena have given rise to two recurring scenarios in the
case reports. The one is that of the couple who marry, have
children, and subsequently go through divorce proceedings. In the
stereotypical case one parent (generally the mother) is granted
custody of the children, while reasonable access is given to the other
parent. Some time later the parent with custody remarries and
applies with the new spouse to adopt the children of the previous
marriage.
The other scenario is that of the unwed mother who marries
someone other than the putative father of her child and then applies
to adopt her child jointly with her husband.
Both of these situations are reflected in recent adoption statistics.
For example, in Nova Scotia between April 1, 1977 and March 31,
1978 one-half of the 714 adoptions granted involved an application
by a relative of the adoptee.is In British Columbia step-parent
adoptions accounted for 34 per cent of all adoptions granted in the
province between 1970 and 1974.17
III. Interests of the Parties
Any consideration of step-parent adoptions should focus on the
interests of the three distinct parties involved: the child, the
step-parent and his spouse, and the non-custodial natural parent.
There can be no doubt that a child has an interest in being brought
up in a "stable and loving home."' 8 With step-parent adoptions,
however, the adoption per se does not change the home
environment of the child (as it does in a conventional adoption); the
child continues to live in the security of the home which his
step-parent and natural parent provide. This basic need of the child
is therefore met without any legal proceedings. In most step-parent
adoption cases, however, there has been a prior divorce by the
child's natural parents. Until recently, the conventional wisdom of
the psychological pundits has been that in order to create a stable
home for the child of a divorce, it was advisable in the majority of
cases to terminate contact between the child and his non-custodial
16. Source: Nova Scotia Dept. of Social Services
17. Fifth Report of the Royal Commission of Family and Children's Law,
Vancouver, British Columbia, March 1975, Part VII - Adoptions, App. A
18. Re Application for Adoption (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 538 (N.S. Co. Ct.) per
O'Hearn, C.C.J. at 552
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biological parent. 19 Currently, however, there is a dawning
realization within the helping professions that a child has a need for
both parents. 20 When one considers that a child may have
developed a deep emotional attachment to the non-custodial parent,
it becomes obvious that the child has a vested psychological interest
in maintaining that relationship. This point of view has received
judicial attention in recent Canadian cases. In Re Munro,21 Zalev,
Co. Ct. J acknowledged that:
a child has a right to the knowledge of the existence of its
natural parents, to a normal association with those parents, and to
the benefit of the love, understanding and guidance which may be
developed in the intimate relationship between the child and its
natural parents. No court should deny a child those rights without
serious reason.
22
Re Munro was expressly approved by the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court, Appeal Division in the recent case of Wolfe v. Cherrett. 
23
Even if the relationship between the child and the absent parent is
not a particularly good one, or due to the young age of the child, has
not had a chance to develop, the research of Triseliotis24 would
indicate that it is in the child's psychological interest not to be
deprived of a knowledge of his "origins."
What are the interests which the step-parent (usually this is the
step-father) and his spouse have in adopting the child? First one
must recognize that simply by marrying the child's mother, the
step-father acquires no parental rights. In law, a step-parent and
step-child are not related to each other. 25 Thus as Ormrod, J. said:
. . . it seems clear that the only way an individual who is not one
of the natural parents can acquire parental rights is by some legal
process vesting in that person the so called parental rights in
19. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child (London:
Collier MacMillan Publishers, 1973)
20. This point of view, and the research supporting it, is summarized consisely in
Rosen, "Joint Custody: In the Best Interests of the Child and Parents" (1978), 1
R.F.L. 116
21. (1973), 11 R.F.L. 21 (Ont. Co. Ct.)
22. Id., at 33. Also see Csicsiri v. Csicsiri (1974), 17 R.F.L. 31 (Alta. S.C.,
T.D.) where Cullen, J. held that "Children are part of a family. They have two
parents and have a right to be influenced in their upbringing by each of the two and
while divorce may dissolve the marraige it does not dissolve the parenthood. .
23. (1978), 28 N.S.R. (2d) 17 (N.S.S.C., A.D.)
24. J. Triseliotis, In Search of Origins (London: Routledge and Keigan Paul Ltd.,
1973)
25. "The Step-Relationship and Its Legal Status" (1976), 5 Anglo-American Law
Rev. 259 at 259
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respect of the given child. 26
Until recently, the courts have been willing to confer these rights
upon a step-parent by granting adoptions almost as a "matter of
course." The acquisition of parental rights, however, is not the only
motivation. Often the "new couple" will want the adoption to go
forward in order to facilitate a change in the surname of the child.
27
In this way an unsuccessful first marriage will not be as apparent to
the couple's neighbours. Additionally, the new couple may wish to
remove the non-custodial natural parent from the child's life, in the
hope that the child "will grow closer to the step-father.''28
Adoption, because of its finality, will also put an end to any further
custody battles between the natural parents. 29 Later in this paper
some alternatives to step-parent adoptions will be considered. At
this point it is sufficient to say that the interests of the step-parent
and his wife may not be congruent with, or facilitative of, the
interests of the child in either the short or long-term.
The non-custodial parent (generally the natural father) who feels
any affection or responsibility for his offspring has an interest in
maintaining contact with the child. This contact is generally
maintained by utilizing access provisions which the father enjoys by
virture of the divorce decree (or an order made under provincial
legislation). As Davey, J. A. has commented:
... the so-called right of access is more than provision of an
opportunity to gratify parental affection for the children; it is also
a right of visitation to enable a parent to discharge adequately his
remaining duties as guardian of the person and estate of his
child.n0
Not only is access of concern to the father, he also has an interest in
preserving his right to apply for the custody of his child should the
appropriate change in circumstances arise.
While the above do not exhaust the possible motivations of the
parties, they are sufficient to indicate that the interests of each of
them are highly divergent.
16. Re. N., [1974] 1 All E.R. 126 (Fam. Div.) at 130
7. In Wolfe v. Cherrett, supra, note 23 at 32 MacKeigan, C.J.N.S. comments
hat a change of name is not an appropriate consideration in weighing the benefits
A a step-parent adoption.
18. Bissett-Johnson, "Step-Parent Adoptions in English and Canadian Law,"
3axter and Eberts (ed.), The Child and the Courts (Toronto: Butterworths and
ompany, 1978) at 336
.9. Khan, "Adoption by Parent and Step-Parent" (1978), 8 Fam. Law 146 at 148
0. Sharp v. Sharp (1962), 40 W.W.R. 521 (B.C.C.A.) at 525
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IV. Dispensing With Consent
"A frequently litigated issue is the power of the court to dispense
with parental consent when an adoption application is made by the
natural parent, who has been awarded custody of the child in a
divorce decree, and his or her new spouse." 3 '
Both the British Columbia Adoption Act 32 and the Children's
Services Act 33 of Nova Scotia have provisions for dispensing with
parental consent to an adoption. Section 8(6) of the British
Columbia Act reads:
8(6) The Court may dispense with any consent required by
sub-section (1) if satisfied that the person whose consent is to be
dispensed with has abandoned or deserted the child or cannot be
found or is incapable of giving such consent, or being a person
liable to contribute to the support of the child, either has
persistently neglected or refused to contribute to such support or
is a person whose consent ought, in the opinion of the Court and
in all the circumstances of the case, to be dispensed with, and the
Court may act on the written report of the circumstances by the
Superintendent, without further evidence.
34
The comparable section of the Children's Services Act (N.S.) is as
follows:
17. Where the county court is satisfied that a person whose
consent is required under subsection (2) or subsection (3) of
section 16
(a) is dead;
(b) is of unsound mind;
(c) is missing or cannot be found;
(d) has deserted or neglected to provide proper care and
maintenance for the child;
(e) has suffered the child to be supported for more than two
years continuously next preceding the date of the
application by a child placing agency;
(f) is divorced and neither has custody nor is contributing to
the support of the child at the time of the application; or
(g) is a person whose consent in all circumstances of the case
ought to be dispensed with.
the county court may order that his consent be dispensed with, if
it is in the interest of the person to be adopted to do so. 35
31. Hughes, "Adoption in Canada", D. Mendes da Costa (ed.), (Butterworths
and Company, 1972) at 147
32. R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4 as am.
33. S.N.S. 1976 c. 8
34. R.S.B.C. 1960, c.4 as am.
35. S.N.S. 1976, c. 8
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Of immediate interest is the fact that these two statutes have
different criteria for dispensing with consent. The Nova Scotia Act
requires the court to consider subsections (a) through (g) and
whether dispensing with the consent of the parent is "in the interest
of the person to be adopted." This "in the interest of the person to
be adopted" qualifier is not found in the Adoption Act (B.C.).
Margaret Hughes states that it was thought that those adoption
statutes which dispensed with consent based on a consideration of
the "interest of the child", would have been interpreted so that the
interests of the child would prevail over the rights of parents, 36
irrespective of the parents' conduct. In fact, she suggests, this has
not been the case. "Although there is a dislike of the proprietary
conception of a parent's rights, many courts, reflecting the
sentiments of Ferguson J., in Re LeSieur, feel that a vast difference
exists between a custody award and an adoption order and that the
courts must protect a parent's fundamental right to raise her own
:hild until she is shown to be unfit. ' 37 An examination of
step-parent adoption practices in British Columbia and Nova Scotia
:asts some doubt on Hughes' statement.
V. Dispensing With Consent in British Columbia.
rhe leading case dispensing with consent in British Columbia is
harp v. Sharp. 38 Although the members of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal were divided over whether the natural mother, who
,vas opposing the step-parent adoption application, had in fact
:nisconducted herself to the point where her consent should have
,een dispensed with, their Lordships were in agreement on what the
aw was. Davey, J. A. stated that:
In our province attention must be focused in the light of the
attendant circumstances, on the person whose consent is to be
dispensed with. The welfare of the child is no doubt one of the
principal circumstances, but it must be related to the qualities,
character, personality, or conduct of the parent whose consent is
to be dispensed with, or matters pertaining to him. The welfare of
the child cannot be considered at large or be treated as a
governing circumstance if it is unrelated to such parent." 39
-is Lordship also forcefully points out that there is a clear
16. Supra, note 31 at 140
17. id.
18. Supra, note 30
19. Supra, note 30 at 530
638 The Dalhousie Law Journal
distinction between custody and adoption considerations. While
there is no doubt that the judicial test in custody proceedings is the
"best interest of the child,' '40 the same considerations should not be
used in order to justify dispensing with consent in an adoption
situation. Wilson, J. A. agreed with Davey, J. A. in relation to the
necessity to consider the fitness of the parent in relation section 8(6)
of the Adoption Act and said at p. 540:
I do not apply the ejusdem generis rule, but I do say that where
particular provisions relating only to fitness for parenthood and
custody, such as those in see. 8(6), dealing with the abandonment
and non-support, are followed by a general provision that the
court may dispense with consent if the natural parent is
a person whose consent ought, in the opinion of the Court and in
all the circumstances of the case, to be dispensed with;
then fitness, and hence the welfare of the infants, remains
(subject to what Cartwright, J. has said as to the elementary
rights of parents) the subject to be explored, always of course in
the light of limitations stated by Cartwright, J.41
The rule in the Sharp case has been applied in subsequent cases in
British Columbia. Illustrative of the court's approach with regard to
dispensing with consent in step-parent adoptions are the cases of Re
Adoption Nos. 60-09-017014 and 62-09-027718,42 Waldron v.
Adams 43 and Smallenberg v. Smallenberg. 44 In Re Adoption Nos.,
McIntyre, J. (as he then was) dispensed with the consent of a natural
father whom he described as a "painter, part-time actor, poor
provider and habitual drinker" who was at least partly responsible
for the emotional problems of his children.
The appellant (natural mother) in Waldron v. Adams based her
appeal on the grounds that the trial judge, in dispensing with her
consent, had "directed his attention only to the interests of the
children and did not consider that aspect of the case together with
the fact that the appellant was a fit parent." 45 Craig, J. A., speaking
for the Court, re-affirmed the Sharp test that "on an application to
dispense with the consent of a natural parent to the adoption, the
welfare of the children must be considered in relation to the
40. Robinson, "Custody and Access", D. Mendes da Costa (ed.), Studies in
Canadian Family Law (Toronto: Butterworths and Company 1972) at 576
41. Supra, note 30
42. [19721 1 W.W.R. 759 (B.C.C.A.)
43. (1978), 2R.F.L. (2d) 220 (B.C.CA.)
44. (1978), 5 R.F.L. (2d) 315 (B.C.S.C.)
45. Supra, note 43 at 227
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"fitness" of the natural parent and that, furthermore, this
determination must also be subject to what Cartwright J. said in
Martin v. Duffell "as to the elementary rights of parents. '"46 The
Court, while holding that the trial judge had not considered the
fitness of the natural mother in determining whether to dispense
with her consent, declined to overturn his decision on the basis that
there were grounds for dispensing with the mother's consent which
fell within the principles set out in Sharp v. Sharp. It is difficult to
ascertain from the case report just what these grounds were. The
trial judge had explicity held that the natural mother was a "fit"
person! The fact that the mother had only visited the children three
times in five years seemed to leave Craig, J.A., with the impression
that she was less than sincere in her desire to maintain a relationship
with her children, but even the learned Judge conceded that the
probable reason for the low number of visits was the fact that the
appellant lived in Edmonton while the children's residence was in
Victoria, B.C. The less than satisfactory dicta of Craig, J.A. will be
discussed further on in this paper in the context of alternatives to
step-parent adoptions. However, before leaving this case and Re
Adoption Nos. we should consider the possible effect which reports
of the Superintendent of Child Welfare may have had on the
decisions.
The Adoption Act of British Columbia was amended by S.B.C.
1970, c. 1, s.3 and the words "and the Court may act on the written
report of the circumstances by the Superintendent, without further
evidence," were added to section 8(6). While reports by social
workers of home circumstances may be of great value to the court, it
is somewhat disturbing to this writer to find as reported in Waldron
v. Adams, that the Court was highly influenced by the fact that "the
Superintendent of Child Welfare has conducted a thorough
investigation into the matter and has concluded that the court should
dispense with the appellant's consent." ' 47 As Professor Bissett-
Johnson has correctly pointed out, the attitudes of social workers
may have been shaped by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnits' Beyond the
Best Interests of the Child, and this may result in reports which
favour the position of the adopting couple without a proper
appreciation of the fact that the natural father will be permanently
"cut out of the child's life" if the adoption is granted. 48 Too great a
46. Supra, note 43 at 225
47. Supra, note 43 at 227
48. Supra, note 28 at 347
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reliance on this type of report could well result in the Court failing
to apply the correct test in step-parent adoption cases .49
The ideal approach to the question of dispensing with consent, in
this writer's view, was employed by Mr. Justice MacDonald in the
recent case of Smallenberg v. Smallenberg.50 The child's parents
had married in 1969, their daughter being born the following year.
The couple divorced in 1974 with custody being given to the mother
and a right of reasonable access being granted to the father. The
mother remarried in 1975 and petitioned with her new husband to
adopt the little girl, but the natural father refused to give his
consent. The considerations of His Lordship are highly instructive.
While he is mildly critical of the natural father's conduct in not
visiting the child more often, he points out that this was largely due
to the fact that the mother and step-father often refused access. His
Lordship is sensitive to the fact that there is "the fullest affection
between him (the natural father) and his daughter and she is glad to
see him.'"'5 The slight emotional disturbance experienced by the
child upon the occasions of her father's visits is viewed by the Judge
as the result of animosity generated by the mother and he expresses
his feeling that "it would be ironic if the party seeking adoption
could improve his chances of success in litigation by conducting
himself in such a way as to increase the disturbance of the child." 5 2
In refusing to dispense with the father's consent His Lordship states
that:
The natural father has something to offer his daughter for the
years to come. His mother has the property of Aldergrove, which
the child has enjoyed visiting, riding the horses and enjoying
generally the farm life. The father as well as the mother has, in
addition to the grandmother, family who welcome the child as
one of themselves. The natural father is there to assume
responsibility and help his daughter should misfortune strike. He
could, and likely woudl, be helpful to her in material and
non-material ways in connection with her growing up and the
furtherance of her life plans. 53
This judgment, focusing as it does on the fact that adoption will
not confer any benefits upon the child which she is not already
49. For another example of the court relying heavily on the recommendations of a
social worker (perhaps to the detriment of the natural father) see Re McLean,
Vancouver Registry No. A01771, May 12, 1978 (B.C.S.C.).
50. Supra, note 44
51. Supra, note 44 at 323
52. Supra, note 44 at 324
53. Supra, note 44 at 323
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receiving with her mother and step-father, the dubious motivation of
the mother and husband, 54 and the drastic consequences to the child
of losing not only the benefit of a loving parent, but the benefit of
his kin, is truly an "enlightened" decision. It is also instructive on
the issue of reports by social workers. In this case both the counsel
for the child and the Superintendent of Child Welfare recommended
that the adoption order be made. The last line of the
Superintendent's report reads: "I continue to believe as stated in my
earlier report, that adoption would be in the best interest as it
presents the least detrimental alternative available."55 There is no
doubt that this social worker had applied the philosophy contained
in Beyond The Best Interest of the Child! Unlike Craig, J.A. in the
Waldron case, MacDonald, L.J.S.C., considers the report, but
makes up his own mind in favour of the natural father.
VI. Dispensing with Consent in Nova Scotia
As noted earlier, Section 17 of the Children's Services Act provides
for dispensing with the consent of a natural parent if the court "is
satisfied that the parent falls within one of the clauses (a) to (g)...
and "if it is in the interest of the person to be adopted to do so."
56
This provision has been interpreted by the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court, Appeal Division in the leading cases of Block v. Benight
57
and Wolfe v. Cherrett.5 8 In the former case, MacKeigan, C.J.N.S.
explained the statutory test in the following words:
The basic question for the judge was whether or not the father
was 'a person whose consent in all the circumstances of the case
ought to be dispensed with' under clause (g) of s.5 (of the old
Adoption Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c.2) and, if so, whether it was, in
the concluding words of s. 5, 'in the interest of the person to be
adopted' that his consent be dispensed with. Accordingly, the
judge had to determine whether on balance there would be a
positive contribution to the welfare of the child by her being
adopted. His conclusion, although expressed in negative terms,
clearly showed that he did not think that adoption would
positively contribute to the child's welfare or that it would
accordingly be in her interest to be adopted. The child would, of
54. "Their desire for the adoption is natural and understandable, but its motivation
is not what they think is best for the child. An objective is to snuff out the father's
right of access to end a disruptive factor in their lives," supra, note 44 at 323.
55. Supra, note 44 at 322
56. Supra, note 23 at 19 per MacKeigan, C.J.N.S.
57. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 210 (N.S.S.C., A.D.)
58. Supra, note 23
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course, continue to have all the benefits of the home with the
appellants whether she was adopted, or not. She would, if
adopted, be deprived, however, of the love and affection of her
natural father. 5 9
In Wolfe v. Cherrett, the Chief Justice expanded the reasoning in
the Block case. The "rights" or natural parents are to be taken into
account in considering whether to dispense with consent only if the
child may benefit, now or in the future, from their exercise in the
particular case. The Chief Justice points out that the Nova Scotia
rule, by not requiring a finding of parental "misconduct" or moral
turpitude, differs from that in operation British Columbia. His
Lordship also re-iterates that custody considerations should not
influence the issue of dispensing with consent, and, in allowing the
appeal by the natural father, he criticizes the trial judge whose
"attention was, unfortunately, primarily, if not entirely, directed by
counsel to the custody issue - would it be better for child to live
with Mr. Cherrett or Mr. Wolfe?"
60
In weighing whether or not there will be a "net gain" to the
child's welfare the Court suggested that the following factors be
considered. On the gain side of the inventory are considerations of
whether the child needs protection from a "bad" parent, whether
the child would benefit from a cessation of visits from the natural
parent which are emotionally upsetting to him, and whether the
child's life will be made more stable and happy if the adopting
parents were themselves made more secure by the granting of the
adoption order. The loss side of the ledger requires asking whether
the child will be deprived of the love, affection, and other benefits
which he could expect from his natural parent, if the adoption is
granted. In addition, the Court suggests that one must consider
whether the child's needs are such that he will benefit, not only
now, but in the future, from continued contact with his natural
parent. This latter point is an extremely important factor in the Chief
Justice's view if the new marriage is of short duration. In the Wolfe
case itself the child's mother had died shortly after remarrying and
the contest was between the objecting natural father and the
step-father. In refusing to dispense with consent the Appeal
Division concluded that the Wolfe boy had nothing significant to
gain by being cut off from his father and could only benefit by
having a "parent in reserve." In Mr. Justice Coffin's view, "the
59. Supra, note 57 at 213
60. Supra, note 23 at 32.
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interests of the parties could, if necessary, be well satisfied in
custody proceedings without embarking on the final and irrevocable
course of dispensing with the consent of the natural father..."61
How is the preceding test applied in Nova Scotia? It is clear from
the cases considered that in order to dispense with consent there
need not be a finding of parental misconduct. However, one would
predict that under the gain - loss analysis of the "positive
contribution" test enunciated by MacKeigan, C.J.N.S. that if (all
other things being equal) non-custodial natural parents had any
contribution to make to the present or future well being of their
child, the courts would not deprive that parent of his rights by
dispensing with his consent.
Interestingly enough, the realities tend to confound the theories.
In Nova Scotia adoption comes within the jurisdiction of the County
Court, with a high proportion of these cases coming before
O'Hearn, Co. Ct.J. Research by this writer (which included
searches in the Dalhousie Law Library, the Nova Scotia Barrister's
Society Library, and a trip into the bowels of the Prothonotary's
vault) failed to discover a single case concerning a step-parent
adoption in which His Honour had refused to dispense with a natural
parent's consent. 62 There is.no doubt that Judge O'Hearn personally
favours the granting of step-parent adoptions. This is evident from
both his judical 63 and extra-judicial statements. 64 In view of the fact
that the Block case was reported in 1974, one could reasonably
expect that in subsequent decisions the lower courts would have
61. Supra, note 23 at 34
62. See: Re Application for Adoption (1967) 64 D.L.R. (2d) 538 (N.S. Co. Ct.);
Re T.A.P., R.E.P., and T.E.P., Halifax Registry No. C.C. 149629, 1971 (N.S.
Co. Ct.); Re J.H.K. Halifax Registry No. C.H. 03688, 1973 (N.S. Co. Ct.); In Re
Hill (1975), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 528 (Co.Ct.);ReA.E.C. (1975) 23 R.F.L. 398 (N.S.
Ct.); Re lWhynot (1977), 23 N.S.R. (2d) 716 (Co. Ct.), and In Re Low, Halifax
Registry No. C.H. 23117, 1978 (N.S. Co. Ct.). The preceding all deal with
step-parent adoptions. The consent of a natural parent was also dispensed with in
Re A.C.C., Halifax Registry No. C.C.1 40192, July 4, 1969 (N.S. Co. Ct.)
(natural mother opposing adoption by paternal grandparents of child born out of
(wedlock) and Re D.I.C. (1971), 4 R.F.L. 35 (N.S. Co. Ct.) (unwed mother
seeking to revoke consent to an adoption).
63. In Re Hill (1975), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 528 N.S. Co. Ct.) at p. 534 O'Hearn J. says:
"I have yet to see a case where the decision (to dispense with the natural parent's
consent) did not prove the better solution."
64. In an interview with County Court Judge O'Hearn on November 7, 1978, His
Honour stated to Ms. Marion Ferguson that he personally was in favour of
step-parent adoptions and was willing to grant them unless there were reasons
which indicated that it was not in the best interests of the child to do so. His prime
concern was to create a stable and secure family in which the child could grow up.
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applied the "positive contribution" approach. In Re Hill65 is a case
in point. An application for adoption was brought by the father of a
seven-year-old boy and his new wife. The child's mother opposed
the adoption and refused to give her consent. In spite of the fact that
the child got along well with his natural mother and enjoyed her
visits, visited his maternal grandparents, and that there was no
animosity between the divorced couple which might disturb the
child, the learned Judge dispensed with the mother's consent and
granted the adoption. Clearly this was a case where adoption made
no positive contribution to the welfare of the child. His reasons
seem to be influenced largely by the fact that the boy's father was in
a dangerous occupation, and in the event of his death, the
step-mother would be left with no legal status vis-a-vis the child if
the adoption wasn't granted. With the greatest respect it is
submitted that alternatives short of adoption could have met this
possible contingency without cutting off the legal rights of the boy's
mother. Judge O'Hearn also notes in his reasons that the natural
mother had admitted that "she would not oppose the application if
she thought it was for the benefit of the child." 66 This unfortunate
phrase may well prove fatal to the interest of the natural parent if
they are appearing before Judge O'Hearn. 67 In the Hill case, His
Honour distinguishes Block v. Benight on the dubious basis that in
Hill there was no real possibility of the boy being deprived of his
natural mother's affection, 68 and illustrates his preference for
creating a new "secure" family for the child by stating that "the
law cannot guarantee what affection is unwilling to provide, but the
legal bond helps to cement the unity that affection has founded." 69
The adoption cases decided by Judge O'Hearn are highly
instructive, if for no other reason, than that they illustrate how
the psychological "set" of a trial judge may affect the outcome of a
case. In Re Hill, Re A.E.C., Re J.H.K., and Re Low all illustrate
that when the "gain-loss" scales are evenly balanced (and in some
of these cases they are clearly tipped in favour of not granting the
65. Supra, note 63
66. Supra, note 63 at 530
67. See similar statements inRe Application for Adoption, note 18, at 541 and Re
Whynot, supra, note 62 at 716.
68. On November 7, 1978 Judge O'Hearn admitted in an interview with Ms.
Marion Ferguson that he had been "overly optimistic" in hoping that the
mother-son relationship could continue in this case.
69. Supra, note 63 at 533.
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adoption) the personal preference of the judge will be the deciding
factor.
Given the reluctance of appellate courts to overturn findings of
fact in the lower courts, the de facto result of the trial judge's
preferences may well be a successful circumvention of applying the
"positive contribution" test in Nova Scotia.
The recognition by the Superior Courts in both British Columbia
and Nova Scotia of the need for caution in dispensing with a
parent's consent is consistent with recent developments in English
law. This subject has been exhaustively discussed by academic
writers, 70 but may be illustrated by considering s. 10(3) of the
English Children Act, 1975 which states that:
Where the application is made to a court in England or Wales and
the married couple consist of a parent and step-parent of the
child, the court shall dismiss the application if it considers the
matter would be dealt with under section 42 (orders of custody,
etc.) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1971.71
This approach is eminently sensible since the making of a
"custodianship" order gives the step-father limited parental (legal)
rights72 without resorting to the drastic consequences of adoption.
As Professor Bissett-Johnson has observed: "However convenient a
beast of burden the step-father might be, it is probably necessary to
grant him some rights to accompany the duties imposed upon him,
without cutting one of the child's parents out of his life." 7 3
Section 10(3) was recently considered by the English Court of
Appeal in Re S(infants) (adoption by parent)74. There the Court of
Appeal upheld the trial judge's refusal to grant the adoption
although the natural father had consented to the application. The
trial judge had taken the view that adoption would not give the
children an increased "sense of security or make them feel more
"integrated" into the new family unit." ' 75 This decision confirms
the earlier decision of Re S76 in which it had been held that even
70. See: Seago and Bissett-Johnson, Cases and Materials on Family Law
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1976) at 418-481; Bissett-Johnson, "Step-Parent
Adoptions" (1978), 41 Mod. L.R. 96; Bissett-Johnson, "Step-Parent Adoptions in
English and Canadian Law," supra, note 28; and Iloggett, "Adoption by
Step-Parents" (1973), 117 Sol. Jo. 606
71. (U.K.), 1975, c. 72
72. See (U.K.), 1975, c. 72, s. 86
73. Supra, note 28 at 338
74. [197713 AllE.R. 671 (C.A.)
75. Id. at 676
76. (1974), 5 Fain. Law 88(C.A.)
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though the consent of the natural father had been given, the court
could still deny the adoption order in the interests of the child.
VII. Putative Father Consideration
What is the position of the putative father in a step-parent adoption?
The recent Nova Scotia case of D.F.T. and D.M.T. v. A.-G. of
Nova Scotia" considered whether or not a putative father had to be
served with notice of application to adopt. The court considered the
restrictive definition of the term "parent" in section 2 of the
Children's Services Act 78 and concluded in the words of
MacDonald, J. A. that a putative father "was not a person whose
consent to the adoption was required and further that there was no
discretion vested by the Act in the trial judge to direct that he be
given notice of the application to adopt his illegitimate child." 7
Section 8(1) (b) of the Adoption Act 80 (B.C.) is similar to the
Nova Scotia provision and only requires the mother's consent
providing the child is illegitimate at the time the mother's consent
was signed.
The fact that a putative father is not entitled to notice means that
in some cases he will not be informed of the adoption until after the
fact. If, however, he does hear of the impending adoption he can
protect his interests before either the Nova Scotia Supreme or
County Court by making an application under the Infant's Custody
Act.81
In the alternative he can apply for custody of his child by
invoking the inherent equitable jurisdiction which the Supreme
Court has by virture of s. 39(10) of the Judicature Act.
82
In British Columbia, a putative father can also apply for custody
under the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This
equitable jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by s. 2(23) of the
Laws Declaratory Act.83 Additionally, the new B.C. Family
77. Halifax Registry No. S.C.A. 00241, Dec. 28, 1978 (N.S.S.C., A.D.)
78. S.N.S. 1976, c. 8.
Section 2(w) reads:
(w) 'parent' means...
(vii) for the purposes of section 10 and 16, the mother of the child, where the
child was born out of wedlock...
79. Supra, note 77 at 10
80. R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4as am.
81. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 145
82. S.N.S. 1972, c. 2
83. R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 213 as am.
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Relations Act84 will allow a putative father to apply for custody or
guardianship of his child providing he falls within the definition of
'parent' in section 1. "Parent" includes ... (ii) where this person
contributes to the support and maintenance of a child for not less
than 1 year, . . . (B) the father of the child where the father and
mother are not married to each other.
VIII. What are the Alternatives?
Given the assumption that step-parent adoptions as a matter of
course may not be a good policy, one must then ask what
alternatives are available to meet the needs of the parties involved.
(1) Alternative One -Custody
It must be remembered that in the majority of situations where a
step-parent appears on the scene there is an order of the Divorce
Court lurking in the background. Generally, one natural parent has
been granted custody of the child of the marriage under section
I1(1) (c) of the Divorce Act. 8 5 This section allows the Divorce
Court, upon granting a decree nisi, to make an order providing for
the custody . . . of the children of the marriage. It should be noted
that the section does not expressly restrict the court to giving
custody to either the petitioner or respondent; the possibility exists
that custody could be vested in a third party. Section 11(2) which is
also broadly stated, provides for variation of the original custody
order if the court that made the order thinks it fit and just to do so
having regard to the conduct, change in condition, means or other
circumstances of either of the parties. It is submitted that, as an
alternative to the drastic consequences of a step-parent adoption the
custodial parent should be able to go back to the Divorce Court
under section 11(2) and have the custody order varied so as to vest
custody, not only in herself, but in her new spouse as well.
If used, this approach would have the distinct advantages of being
available throughout Canada, and, since it is under Federal
legislation, of not being subject to the differences in provincial
custody or guardianship statutes.
Chief Justice MacKeigan, in the Wolfe8 6 case, suggested yet
another way in which a step-parent could acquire custody. His
84. S.B.C. 1978, c. 20.
85. R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8
86. Supra, note 23 at 31
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suggestion was that the step-father, with the Administrator's
consent, could apply for a custody order under s. 67 of the
Children's Services Act.8 7 Given the propensity of child welfare
professionals to favour step-parent adoptions, it would probably not
be difficult to get the Administrator's consent to proceed with a
custody application. In this way the step-father's needs for some
legal authority vis-a-vis the child could be satisfied. In British
Columbia step-parents are expressly defined as 'parents' by section
1 of the Family Relations Act 88 thus giving them standing to apply
for custody of their step-children.
(2) Alternative Two -Guardianship
One of the frequently given reasons for granting a step-parent
adoption over the protestations of the non-custodial natural parent is
that should the parent with custody die, the step-parent (who may
have become emotionally attached to the child) will have no legal
rights vis-a-vis the child and hence will not be able to prevent the
surviving parent from regaining custody of the child.
This consideration was given great weight in the obiter dicta of
Craig, J. A. in the case of Waldron v. Adams andAdams8 9 where he
said at p. 228:
If the court refused to make the order in this case, what would be
the position of the respondent (step-mother) Gloria Adams in the
event that Wayne Adams died while the children were young? In
such a case, the respondent Gloria Adams would not have any
right to custody of the children. Should the appellant, in such
circumstances, have the right to take the children into her custody
and into a home in Edmonton where her husband is a total
stranger to the children and she is only regarded as the "aunt",
particularly when there is nothing before the court with regard to
the character of the new husband, his suitability as a parent, or
his willingness to act as a parent to the children?
In my opinion, this consideration alone, in the circumstances of this
case, is a very cogent reason for dispensing with the appellant's
consent in making the adoption order.
87. S.N.S. 1976, c. 8
88. S.B.C. 1978, c. 20, s. I reads:
"parent" includes
(ii) where this person contributes to the support and maintenance of a child
for not less than 1 year,
(A) the stepmother or stepfather of the child...
89. Supra, note 43
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It is submitted that this reason becomes considerably less
"cogent" if one considers that under the Equal Guardianship of
Infants Act 90 either a father or mother may, by deed or will, appoint
a person to act as a guardian of an infant child after his or her death
respectively. 91 Where a guardian has been appointed under section
6 of the Act, the surviving parent exercises all his powers jointly
with the guardian. 92 Furthermore, a guardian is granted standing in
custody proceedings relating to the child by virtue of section 13,
93
and if the guardian assumes, in writing, his guardianship, he
"thereupon possesses the same authority over the infant as he or she
would have were the ward his own or her own child, and is bound to
perform the duties of a parent toward such ward." 4
As the law in British Columbia presently stands, only a parent (or
the court, after the removal of an existing guardian) may appoint a
guardian. This restriction on who can apply for guardianship led the
British Columbia Royal Commission on Family and Children's Law
to make the following recommendations:
30. Recommendations: The Court should be able to at any time,
on application made for the purpose or on the making of an
order for the removal of a guardian, appoint a guardian of a
child either as sole guardian or in addition to any other
guardian, providing that it is in the best interests of the child
to do so. In addition, the court should be able, where
necessary, to specify the period of time during which the
guardian may exercise his guardianship. ..95
32. Recommendation: Where there is an application to adopt the
Court should be able to deny the application and substitute
instead an order for guardianship if it thinks that it is in the
best interest of the child to do so.
95A
Both of these recommendations are based on the express
recognition by the Commission of the "emotional ties between the
child and his natural non-custodial parent" 96 and the value of
preserving those ties. Even if the custodial parent hadn't appointed a
90 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 130
91. Id., s. 6
92. Id., s. 7
93. And note: a guardian may himself appoint a guardian by section 15(1) Re
Wood [ 1971] 2 W.W.R. 392 (B.C.S.C.)
94. R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 130, s. 15
95. Fifth Report of the British Columbia Commission on Family and Children's
Law, Part VI - Custody, Access and Guardianship, at 52
95. A Id., at 55
96. Id., at 55
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guardian, the problem of concern to the Court in Waldron v.
Adams97 could certainly be solved in these recommendations were
implemented. The consequence would be that the bond between one
natural parent and their child would not be irrevocably served.
The Guardianship Act98 of Nova Scotia provides that
3. The parents jointly, or the parent having the custody or care
of an infant may be instrument in writing executed in the
presence of two witnesses appoint a guardian of such infant
until the infant reaches the age of majority or marries, or for
any shorter period, and such parents or parent may make the
appointment even though not of the age of majority. 99
While the main thrust of the Nova Scotia Act deals with probate
matters, section 7 provides that a guardian appointed under the Act
"shall (inter alia) have the charge and management of his (the
child's) property, real and personal, and the care of his person and
education."
(3) Alternative Three - Change of Name
The recently enacted Change of Name Act' 00 in Nova Scotia
makes it possible for a parent having the custody of an infant child
to apply to the County Court to have the child's name changed.
"Name" is defined by section 2(f) to include surname. By section 6
of the Act "a person whose marriage has been dissolved or annulled
may make application for a change of name of one or more of his
unmarried infant children, with the consent of the other parent."
Under section 10 of the Act, consent can be dispensed with under
certain circumstances. In the context of alternatives to a S - P
adoption, the relevant reasons for dispensing with consent would be
that the person whose consent is required is (s. 10(1) (f)) "divorced
and neither has custody nor is contributing to the support of the
child at the time of application," or (s. 10(1) (h)) "is a person
whose consent in all the circumstances of the case ought to be
dispensed with." Additionally, the judge must consider whether it
is in the interest of the person whose name is to be changed to do so.
By section 8 of the Act the mother of a child born out of wedlock,
and not adopted or legitimated may apply to have the child's name
changed. If, however, the child has been registered with the
97. Supra, note 43
98. R.S.N.S. 1967, c 121 as am.
99. Id., s. 3
100. S.N.S. 1977, c. 6
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surname of a person who acknowledges paternity, that person's
consent is required to change the child's name.101
The requirements of consent can largely be circumvented by a
judge using his discretion under section 10(2) to dispense with
consent where a child has informally changed his name and has
been known by that name for a period of at least three years
immediately preceding the application. This section may be of
limited use in the context of re-marriages where the pressure to
legally formalize the family surname often occurs very shortly after
the divorce of the natural parents, however the use of an alias is not
illegal in British Columbia (Hoodekoff v. Hoodekoff (1976), 25
R.F.L. 8(B.C.S.C.)) so many couples simply change the child's
name informally and "wait out" the three years.
Unlike the Nova Scotia situation, where the natural parent who
has remarried brings the application to change the surname of her
children, in British Columbia it is the step-father who must apply to
have the surname of his wife's children changed.
Section 4(5) of the Change of Name Act 10 2 reads as follows:
4(5) If a person is a married man, he may, with the consent in
writing of the mother and of the father, and subject to subsection
(7), make application...
(b) to change the surname to his own surname;. . . of any of the
unmarried minor children of his wife born prior to his marriage to
her of whom she has lawful custody.
In the event that the natural father's consent isn't given, the
Supreme Court may make an order under section 4(9) dispensing
with his consent, if it considers that the change of name will not
"unduly prejudice" the person whose consent is dispensed with.
While the phrase "unduly prejudice" has not yet been the subject of
judicial comment in the change of name context, it should be noted
that the current section 4(9) was the result of a very recent
amendment. 103 Prior to this amendment the test for dispensing with
consent to a change of name was "the best interest of the applicant
101. This results in the anomalous situation where in adoption proceedings under
the Children's Services Act, S.N.S. 1976, c. 8 a putative father's consent to
adoption isn't required (D.F.T. and D.M.T. v. Attorney General of Nova Scotia
(1978) unreported decision (N.S.S.C., A.D.) while under the Change of Name Act
his consent is required, providing he has acknowledged that he is the father!
102. R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 30 as amended by S.B.C. 1972, c. 1I and S.B.C. 1977,
c.5
103. S.B.C. 1977, c. 5, s. 2(d)
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and all other persons included in the application. 104 This "best
interest test" was applied by MacKinnon, L.J.S.C. in the case of Re
Keehn, 10 5 where a 15 year old boy applied to have his given name
changed. The boy's parents had recently divorced with considerable
animosity. Mr. Justice MacKinnon notes that the husband was
probably correct in suggesting that his former wife had brought the
application in order to embarrass him, but granted the application on
the basis that since the boy had been using his "new" name for a
considerable period of time, and was known by it, that it was in his
best interest to have it changed.
The new "undue prejudice test" will hopefully make judges
more aware of the effects of name changes by focusing their
attention on the interests of the non-custodial parent which could be
adversely affected. This would be consistent with the view
expressed by Professor Bisset-Johnson that:
It may be necessary for the courts to consider with greater
sensitivity the plight of divorced husbands, so they do not feel
that in addition to losing custody of their children. . . they also
have their children known by another man's name. To divorced
husbands this is not a peripheral matter. . . nor is it just a sense of
proportion. In the long term, children may need to feel that they
have not had their good name filched from them by their mothers
and their ties with their fathers weakened. '
0 6
In addition to the possibility that a required consent might not be
dispensed with, the British Columbia Act provides that:
8(2) Where the Director of Vital Statistics is of the opinion that
the name that the applicant seeks to adopt might reasonably cause
mistake or confusion, or be a cause of embarrassment or
confusion to any other person, or that a change of name is sought
for an improper purpose, or is on any other ground
objectionable, he shall refuse the application. '
0 7
Again, there has been no judicial comment on how broadly this
section should be interpreted. Does it mean that even where all
required consents are given, the Director has discretion to refuse the
application if, for example, a step-father brings an application at the
insistence of his new wife who is motivated only by a desire to
embarrass her former spouse, and to alienate him from his children
104. S.B.C. 1972, c. 11, s. 2
105. (1976), 28 R.F.L. 53 (B.C.S.C.)
106. Bissett-Johnson, "Name Changes" (1978), 4 Adoption and Fostering 58, at
61
107. S.B.C. 1972, c. 11, s. 5
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by introducing the subtle psychological pressure of a name change?
Finally we must consider the situation where a woman, who has
had a child out of wedlock, marries a man who is not the father of
her child. In the event that the step-father doesn't wish to adopt the
child, whose consents are necessary in order to effect a change of
:name? Section 4(6) (e) of the British Columbia Act says that an
"unmarried mother" may apply to change the name of her minor
children. The section clearly implies that the putative father's
consent isn't required.108 This section obviously applies to the
situation where an "unmarried mother" is still unmarried. If she
does marry she will not be an "unmarried mother" at the time of
her application for a name change for her child, and therefore
section 4(6) is inapplicable. In theory her husband (the step-father)
should bring the application under section 4(5), supra. This raises
fhe neat question as to whether the consent of the putative father will
Je required under section 4(5) while it is not required under section
4(6). Unfortunately the Interpretation Act'0 9 does not solve the
Jilemma - no definition of "father" is given.
IX. Alternatives for the non-custodial parent - the question of
7ccess
3enerally, applications to adopt step-children are met with
.esistance in the form of refusal to give consent on the part of the
ion-custodial parent. The motivation for such refusal is that
idoption will terminate whatever access rights the non-custodial
)arent presently has, or might acquire in the future. The
.onventional wisdom (legally and otherwise) for many years was
hat an order for adoption acted as a guillotine, cutting off one
iatural parent from his child's life forever. As McIntyre, J. put it
vhile dispensing with the consent of a natural father to an adoption:
It follows that the father's application for access to the children
must also fail, since the order for access would be inconsistent
with the adoption. "0
.n Nova Scotia, O'Hearn, C.C.J. has often stated in his judgments
n step-parent adoption cases that he wished he could make access
)f the natural parent a condition of the adoption order,"' and, while
08. See Fifth Report of the British Columbia Royal Commission on Family and
'hildren's Law, Part II, at 78
09. S.B.C. 1974, c. 42 as am.
10. Re Adoption, supra note 42 at 765
11. See, for example: Re Hill (1975), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 528 at 534
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acknowledging that this was not possible, has expressed the hope
that the adopting parents would allow the biological parent a place
in the child's life.
The basis of the judicial reluctance to grant access to a natural
parent in the adoption order is to be found in those sections of the
adoption statutes of the various provinces which deal with the
effects of an adoption order. In Nova Scotia this is section 22 or the
Children's Services Act. 1
12
There appears to have been, until very recently, considerable
consistency between the literal wording of the statue, the case law
and the academic writers as to the effect of these sections. 113 The
effect of both the British Columbia and Nova Scotia adoption
statutes is to give "the adopted child the status of a child born in
lawful wedlock to the adopters"' 114 with all the legal rights and
obligations which flow thereform. The corollary of this is that the
relationship between the natural parent and the child ceases upon the
granting of the adoption order. In the conventional view this
included termination of access.
Three recent cases, all originating in British Columbia, have cast
some doubt on this particular view of the law. In Kerr v.
McWhannell and McWhannell' 15 the appellant had been found to be
a person in loco parentis (as defined by the Divorce Act)116 and had
been granted access to the child under the divorce decree. The
child's mother subsequently remarried and applied with her new
spouse to adopt the child. The judge of first instance granted the
adoption, and the appeal was made on two issues:
(a) the appellant's right to continued access should have been
determined on a substantive application for the purpose before
any adjudication could be made on the adoption; and (b) the
appellant is a 'parent' within the meaning of The Adoption Act,
R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4, s. 8(1) (b) (re-en. 1968, c.4, s.4), and his
consent to the adoption has been neither given nor dispensed
with. 1 7
While McFarlane, J.A. found against the appellant on both
grounds, his obiter dicta dealt directly with the question of whether
112. S.N.S. 1976, c. 8. For the relevant legislation in British Columbia see The
Adoption Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4 as am., s. 10
113. e.g. Hughes, M., "Adoption in Canada" in Mendes da Costa (ed.) Studies in
Canadian Family Law at 167 et seq.
114. Id., at 167
115. (1974), 16R.F.L. 185 (B.C.C.A.)
116. R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8, s.2
117. Supra, note 115 at 186, 187
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an order for adoption could terminate existing access rights granted
under the Divorce Act.
. . . It is apparent this ground of appeal rests on the view that the
order appealed from terminates the appellant's rights of access
given to him in the divorce proceedings.
In my opinion, the order does not, ana does not support, to have
that effect. Accordingly, the question whether Rae J. had the
necessary authority in this adoption matter to terminate the rights
of access does not arise. I should not be understood as suggesting
that he did not have the authority. I think his reasons show that he
considered the possibility of such termination being a result of his
decision to approve the adoption. He did not, however, terminate
the appellant's rights to access expressly or formally and, in my
opinion, his order does not do so by implication. I see nothing
inconsistent in the child's being adopted by the respondents while
at the same time the appellant retains his rights of access.
Adoption affects legal relationships of the child. Custody and
access rights can be given in proper cases to persons who have no
legal relationship to the child involved.
The view that the order appealed from does not deprive the
appellant of his rights to access is concurred in by the counsel
who appeared for the respective Attorneys General. What is more
important in my opinion is that counsel for the respondents took
the same position and reaffirmed that stand on the hearing of this
appeal. He went further and stated frankly that if this appeal be
dismissed it is his clients' intention to apply in the divorce
proceedings to have all the appellant's rights of access
terminated. I cannot, therefore, give effect to the first ground of
appeal and in reaching that conclusion I do not overlook the
provisions of s. 10(2) of The Adoption Act. 118
The fact that the appellant lost on his first ground of appeal did
not mean that his access rights had been terminated, since no
application had been made on that issue and the trial judge had not
so held..
The paramountcy of rights conferred by a Federal Statute was
considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Natural Parents v.
Superintendent of Child Welfare, 119 in a case where a white couple
attempted to adopt an Indian child with treaty-status. The child had
been apprehended on two occasions under the Protection of
Children Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 303 because he had been injured
and neglected by his parents. The trial Judge, while desirous of
dispensing with the natural parent's consent, declined to do so and
118. Supra, note 115 at 187, 188
119. (1975), 21 R.F.L. 267 (S.C.C.)
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dismissed the application on the basis that "to the extent that the
operation of The Adoption Act would affect the status of the child as
an Indian, and so extinguish his rights as an Indian, it is inconsistent
with the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.I-6."120 The British Columbia
Court of Appeal reversed the decision unanimously. 121 The
Supreme Court of Canada, while dividing over the issue as to
whether or not the British Columbia Adoption Act was referentially
incorporated into the Indian Act, dismissed the appeal and allowed
the adoption. The Court confirmed the validity of the provincial
adoption legislation, holding that as legislation generally applicable
throughout the province, it could affect Indians. 122 As Martland, J.
said:
I do not find any conflict between the provisions of The Adoption
Act and the Indian Act. I agree with the view expressed in the
Court of Appeal that the words "for all purposes" in subss. (1)
and (2) of s. 10 of The Adoption Act must be taken to refer to all
purposes within the competence of the British Columbia
Legislature. Section 10, even prior to the enactment of subs.
(4a), did not purport to deprive the child of any status or rights
which he possessed under the Indian Act at the time of his
adoption, and it is clear that no provincial legislation could
deprive him of such rights. ' 23
The result of the Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child
Welfare case is that the Supreme Court of Canada has re-affirmed a
principle of constitutional law which is of great importance in the
"adoption-after-divorce" context. There has been no doubt that
adoption fell within the domain of provincial legislative competence
since the Reference re Adoption Act case, 124 and that s. 91(12) of
the B.N.A. Act clearly gives the Federal Parliament the right to
legislate in relation to "marriage and divorce." In reaching the
decision in Natural Parents the Court once again reaffirmed the
principle that where rights conferred under a Federal statute come
into conflict with a piece of provincial legislation, the Federal
statute will prevail. As Hogg puts it:
Since the introduction in 1968 of the corollary relief provisions of
the federal Divorce Act there has been the possibility of conflict
between orders made under provincial law and orders made under
120. Id., at 280per Martland, J.
121. [1974] 3 W.W.R. 363 (B.C.C.A.)
122. Supra, note 119 at 282 per Martland, J.
123. Supra, note 119 at 285
124. [19381 S.C.R. 398
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the Divorce Act. In my opinion, the existence of conflict and its
consequences should be determined by the relatively well-settled
body of constitutional law which resolves conflicts between
federal and provincial laws, that is to say, the doctrine of federal
paramountcy. 1
25
Thus, a particular status granted by a federal statute cannot be
defeated by the operation of a valid provincial Adoption Act. This
leads to two potential arguments as to why a non-custodial parent's
access should not be terminated by an order for adoption.
First, if access is perceived as a "right of the child", 126 then on
the basis of the reasoning in the Natural Parents case, the operation
of federal paramountcy would preclude the Adoption Act from
altering that status, thus leaving the child with his "right" intact
after an adoption order. Alternatively, on the basis of Kerr v.
McWhannell and McWhannell, if an order giving access has been
made under the Divorce Act, federal paramountcy will operate to
maintain that person's right of access, although the provincial
adoption order will extinguish his or her rights as parent per se.
Given this background of judicial thinking in both the Supreme
Court of Canada and the British Columbia Court of Appeal, it is not
surprising that the Supreme Court of British Columbia made the
final conceptual leap in the recent case of North v. North. 1
27
The facts of this case are of interest. Mr. North had married in
1964, and two children were born during the course of the marriage.
The couple divorced in 1973 and under the decree nisi the petitioner
(husband) was granted custody of the children with reasonable and
generous access to the respondent (mother). The respondent
subsequently moved to New Zealand and did not return to British
Columbia until 1976. During her absence from the province, her
former husband remarried and applied with his new spouse to adopt
his children. 'When efforts to contact the natural mother proved
unsuccessful, her consent was dispensed with by the Court and the
adoption was granted. On her arrival back in Canada, the natural
mother sought an order from the Court to define the terms of the
access which had been granted to her under the divorce decree. As
Mr. Justice MacFarlane put it:
The question arises whether the granting of an order under the
125. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: The Carsell Co. Ltd., 1977)
at 376
126. See:M. v.M., [1973] 2All E.R. 81 (Fan. Div.)
127. Vancouver Registry No. 5936/14590, May 3, 1978 (B.C.S.C.)
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Adoption Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4, has the effect of terminating
access rights granted in an order made under the Divorce Act. 128
His Lordship cites Kerr v. McWhannell and McWhannell with
approval and agrees with counsel for the biological mother that "a
right of access does not depend upon a parental relationship, and
that the Adoption Act provisions deal primarily with the legal status
of the natural and adopting parents vis-a-vis the child, not with the
inter-personal relationship of the natural parents and the child." 
129
His Lordship concludes:
In my opinion a valid order made in the exercise of jurisdiction
conferred by the Divorce Act must be considered paramount to an
order made under a provincial statute, and rights so acquired
cannot be taken away by an adoption order. 130
It will be interesting to see if other provincial superior courts
follow the lead of North v. North. In many respects it could be
argued that it paves the way to meeting many of the needs of the
parties to a step-parent adoption.
X. Summary
This article has attempted to survey a number of current issues of
the law relating to step-parent adoptions in British Columbia and
Nova Scotia. The recent cases of Smallenberg (in B.C.) and Wolfe
v. Cherrett (in N.S.) are encouraging signs that Canadian courts are
becoming more sensitive to the needs of non-custodial parents and
more aware of the long-term interests of the child in deciding
whether or not to dispense with consent. It is hoped that this trend
will continue.
Additionally, the basic alternatives to step-parent adoptions have
been explored. The use of custody and guardianship orders in
favour of step-parents under the new Family Relations Act in British
Columbia should prove to be a useful method of giving step-parents
some rights towards the child of their spouse, thus increasing their
security in the new family.
The latest developments relating to access after adoption in
British Columbia will bear watching. It will be of particular interest
to see if the decision of North v. North is applied in Nova Scotia by
judges who wish to grant step-parent adoptions while simultaneously
maintaining access rights for a deserving natural parent.
128. Supra, note 127 at 2
129. Id., at 5
130. Id.
